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Abstract
In this work we discuss the main building blocks, achievements and chal-
lenges of an evolutionary interpretation of the relation between mechanisms
of coordination and drivers of change in modern economies, seen as complex
evolving systems. It is an evident stylised fact of modern economic systems
that there are forces at work which keep them together and make them grow
despite rapid and profound modifications of their industrial structures, social
relations, techniques of production, patterns of consumption. We suggest that
a fruitful interpretation of the two processes rests in what we call the “bicycle
conjecture”: in order to stand up you must keep cycling. However, changes
and transformation are by nature “disequilibrating” forces. Thus there must
be other factors which maintain relatively ordered configurations of the system
and allow a broad consistency between the conditions of material reproduction
(including income distributions, accumulation, available techniques) and the
thread of social relations.
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1 Change and Coordination: an Introduction
In this work we discuss the main building blocks, achievements and challenges of
an evolutionary interpretation of the relation between mechanisms of coordination
and drivers of change in economies seen as complex evolving systems. Certainly,
in economic systems there are forces at work which keep them together and make
them grow in relatively ordered manners (often but not always) despite rapid and
profound modifications of their industrial structures, social relations, techniques of
production, patterns of consumption, which as such, are “disequilibrating” forces.
Thus, there must be factors which maintain relatively ordered configurations of the
system and allow a broad consistency between the conditions of material reproduc-
tion (including income distributions, accumulation, available techniques) and the
thread of social relations.
Very daringly, indeed, the article attempts to address the two basic questions at
the core of the whole economic discipline since its inception which regard, first, the
drivers and patterns of change of the capitalist machine of production and innovation
and, second, the mechanisms of coordination among a multitude of self-seeking
economic agents often characterized by conflicting interests. Of course, of crucial
importance are the answers which diverse theories offer to these two questions, but
equally important, the relations purported between the two.
The interplay between change and coordination, well before Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, has been at the core of the analyses of Adam Smith and later Marx and
Schumpeter. Change and transformation of technologies, industrial structures, or-
ganizations and social relations shape the evolution of the capitalist system which
is characterised by processes of endogenous self-sustained growth, punctuated by
small and big crises. The process of economic growth is all but steady:
Industrial mutation – if I may use the biological term – that incessantly
revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. [Schumpeter, (1947),
p. 83]
Interestingly, Adam Smith begins his Wealth of Nations with a detailed analysis
of the drivers of change - in particular the positive feedbacks between division of
labour, mechanisation, productivity growth and demand growth, while issues of co-
ordination are discussed much later, building on such a dynamic background. Much
later and from a quite different angle, Keynes too never dreamt of separating “what
keeps the system together” from “what keeps it going”: in fact, the properties of
shorter term coordination were derived from the properties of capital accumulation
and the animal spirits driving it.
As well known, the current dominant theoretical creed is very much on the an-
alytical opposite to Smith and Keynes. It builds on the separation between “coor-
dination” and “dynamics”, starting from the former, and assuming away the latter
in a first approximation. The “coordination research program”, soon culminated
into the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie General Equilibrium model, has been indeed an
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elegant and institutionally very parsimonious demonstration of the possibility of
equilibrium coordination amongst decentralized agents. However, subsequent basi-
cally negative, results have shown the general impossibility of moving from existence
theorems to that sort of implicit dynamics captured by proofs of global or local sta-
bility - loosely speaking, the property of the system, when scrambled, to get back to
its equilibrium state. Quite the contrary, even empirically far-fetched processes such
as taˆtonnements (with the omniscient Walrasian auctioneer proclaiming equilibrium
transaction when he sees them) in general do not converge. Even more powerfully,
some of the founding fathers of GE themselves have shown that existence does not
bear any implication in terms of the shape of excess demand functions (this is what
the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem implies). Putting it shortly, in general
even forget local stability! Conversely, any careful look at the toll requirements
which sheer existence entails - in terms of information and rationality - highlights
the extent to which GE is a beautiful but extremely fragile creature, certainly unable
to withhold the weight of any account of the coordination processes of the economy
as a whole and even less so, to offer any serious micro-foundation to transforming
economies undergoing various forms of innovation. In fact, if the conditions - in
term of rationality, characteristics of the exchange, etc. - required in reality were
even vaguely as stringent as those required in GE models, probably no one would
be ever observed in the real world!
Here, we propose to revert to the old Smithian style of interpretation, beginning
with the understanding of the drivers of change and only next try to understand the
(imperfect) coordinating properties of the economic systems. It is what we call the
bicycle conjecture: in order to stand up you must keep cycling. However, in order
to operationalize the conjecture, very tall tasks concern, first, the identification of
“what is there to be explained” - that is the empirical and historical stylized facts
at different level of aggregation and different time scales - and, second, explore how
we theoretically account for them.
In contemporary economies one observes that technological knowledge is to a
good extent incorporated into corporate organizations, in the form of shared cogni-
tive frames and organizational routines, evolving over time as a result of learning,
innovation and adaptation. In turn, such (heterogeneous) firms operate in compet-
itive environments which contribute to determine their revealed performances - in
terms of growth, profitability and survival probabilities - and collectively the evo-
lution of the whole industry to which they belong. Indeed, the evolution of diverse
industries and the emergence driven by technological and organizational learning
are also at the heart of the process of development and macroeconomic growth.
How does the theory accounts for the foregoing historical patterns and stylised
facts? Under the prevailing paradigm, it does that trying to rationalise each em-
pirical regularity with “the combined assumptions of maximazing behaviour, mar-
ket equilibrium and stable preferences, used relentlessly and consistently” (Becker,
1976). Here, we propose an alternative view largely based on opposite building
blocks, aimed at understanding the economy as a complex evolving system. In a nut-
shell, such a perspective attempts to understand a wide set of economic phenomena
- ranging from microeconomic behaviours to the features of industrial structures
3
and dynamics, all the way to the properties of aggregate growth and development -
as outcomes of far-from-equilibrium interactions among heterogeneous agents, char-
acterized by endogenous preferences, most often boundedly rational but always ca-
pable of learning, adapting and innovating with respect to their understandings of
the world in which they operate, the technologies they master, their organizational
forms and their behavioural repertoires.
In the sections we shall discuss the building blocks of such a perspective (Section
2), some of its domain of applications (Section 3), concluding with some challenges
ahead (Section 4).1
2 The economy as a complex evolving system
Start with the most minimalist notion of complexity: it stands at the very least for
the fact that the economy is composed by multiple interacting actors. As H. Simon,
also cited in Kirman, (2016), puts it:
Roughly by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of
parts that interact in a non-simple way. In such systems, the whole is
more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical sense,
but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the
parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer
the properties of the whole. [Simon, (1969), p. 267]
Indeed, the properties of the whole are generally emergent properties, that is
collective properties stemming from the local interaction among multiple agents,
which however cannot be attributed to the intentionality of any agents or collection
of them (more in Lane, 1993; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977; Camazine, 2001). Note
that complexity and emergence do not prevent at all the search for possible laws
of motion of any system, but they do rule out any “antropomorphization” of the
interpretation of whatever dynamics, so familiar in contemporary theory. Moreover
evolution entails that any assumption of “given the fundamentals” (including tech-
nologies and preferences) in most circumstances implies a significant violence to the
object of study. Of course for any analysis of a complex and evolving economy one
has to go well beyond the Schumpeter/Samuelson separation between coordination
and change. The (imperfect) coordinating features of the system are fundamen-
tally shaped by its evolving nature. The relatively orderly properties of capitalist
economies derive from its being in motion. This is the relative order of “restless
capitalism” (Metcalfe, 1998). So for example, prices move roughly in line with the
average costs of production which in turn depend on the underlying (technology-
specific and sector-specific) rates of process innovation. Demand patterns are shaped
by the ensuing prices and, possibly even more importantly, by the trajectories in
product innovation. Gross and net labour demand are affected by the double nature
of technical progress as a “labour saver” and as a “demand creator”. Among many
others, these are all features of imperfect coordination in evolving systems. And so
1A very enticing and compelling discussion, complementary the present one is in Shaikh, (2012).
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are the distributional properties of whatever statistics on economic variables which
stem precisely from the fact that the system is changing all the time in its process
and product innovations, consumption patterns, organizational forms.
2.1 Routines, Rules of Thumb, Heuristics
The first question one needs to address is: how do agents behave? In the tradition of
Evolutionary Economics, routines, rules of thumb and heuristics have been the core
pillars describing the behaviour of agents. In Cohen et al., (1996), S. Winter provides
a conceptual classification of the three latter categories: (i) routines are automated,
repetitive and unconscious behaviours which require a high level of information
processing (e.g. working in an assembly lines, making airline reservation or bank
transactions); (ii) rules of thumb are relatively simple decision rules which require
low level of information processing involving some quantitative decisions (e.g. the
share of R&D over total sales, the fixed mark-up); (iii) heuristics are guidelines and
behavioural orientations adopted to face problem solving which do not provide any
ready-to-use solution, but only broad strategies (e.g. in decision making, “Do what
we did the last time a similar problem came up”, in bargaining, “Ask always more
than what you desire”, in technology, “Make it smaller/Make it faster”).
These three elements are the traits of organizations and they are both (i)
problem-solving action patterns and (ii) mechanisms of control and governance in-
side the organization. The conflicting nature of interests, knowledge, and preferences
inside organizations, like firms, is well summarized in March, (1962): rather than
maximizing units, firms are better represented in terms of political coalitions. In
fact, some regular patterns in the behaviour of firms are typical footprint of organi-
zations acting as political coalition. They include (i) the tolerance of inconsistencies
in both goals and decisions over time and inside the organization, (ii) decentralised
goals and decisions with loose cross-connections, (iii) slowly shifts over time in re-
sponse to shifts in the coalition But given the nature of the firm as a political
coalition, how can we model its behaviour?
In the recent years, the introduction of the computer and the computer
program model to the repertoire of the theorist has changed dramatically
the theoretical potential of process description models of conflict sys-
tems. Complex process description models of organizational behaviour
permit a development of a micro-economic theory of the firm. [March,
(1962) p. 674–675]
In tracing the Agenda for Evolutionary Economics, Winter, (2016) emphasizes
how the use of the maximization procedure is intrinsically inappropriate to study
the behaviour of the firms. March, (1962) shared long ago the same concern:
Generally speaking, profit maximization can be made perfectly mean-
ingful (with some qualifications); but when made meaningful, it usually
turns out to be invalid as a description of firm behaviour. [...] With few
exceptions, modern observers of actual firm behaviour report persistent
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and significant contradictions between firm behaviour and the classical
assumptions. [March, (1962) p. 670]
The profit-seeking maximizing behaviour of firms is carefully debunked in Win-
ter, (1964) who points two lines of criticism to the assumption of profit maximiza-
tion: first, even though it is reasonable to conceive firms as having goals, is not
appropriate to assume that the operational goal is profit maximization. Rather,
organizations try to satisfy some objectives operationally different from profit max-
imization. Second, in a world characterised by continuous change it is impossible to
pursue any profit maximization for the lack of any thorough understanding of the
detailed structures of ever-changing worlds.
In his Nobel Memorial Lecture Simon, (1979) stresses how the failure of omni-
science are “failures of knowing all of the possible alternatives, uncertainty about
exogenous events, and inability to calculate consequences” (p. 502). Results from a
vast literature in experimental economics show that:
it is not that people do not go through the calculations that would
be required by the subjective expected utility decision – neoclassical
thought has never claimed that they did. What has been shown is that
they do not even behave as if they have carried out those calculations,
and that result is a direct refutation of the neoclassical assumptions.
[Simon, (1979), p. 507]
There are good reasons why agents in such evolutionary environment adopt
robust and rather information-independent heuristics. But, what is a heuristic?
[It is] a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of
making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more
complex methods. [Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, (2011), p. 454]
Note that, heuristics are not “biases” yielding sub-optimal behaviours (as one would
gather from Kahneman, 2002, or from the bulk of the behavioural economics), but
might be “locally ex-post optimal strategies” that outperform purportedly “rational”
choices in large worlds characterised by substantive and procedural uncertainty (Dosi
and Egidi, 1991), as well as drivers of major contagion-fuelled disasters.
A clearcut example of the use of heuristics in trading behaviours is highlighted
in finance. As DeMiguel et al., (2009) show, over a sample of seven datasets, the
simple 1/N rule outperforms the Markov Portfolio strategy in fourteen alternative
portfolio specifications. “Rational” allocation strategies yield very high estimation
errors in the variance-covariance matrices. In fact, in changing and distributional
variant worlds, the simple 1/N strategy happens to be much more robust and less
error prone.
2.2 Coordination vis - a` - vis Equilibrium
The term Evolutionary recalls the field of Biology wherein the processes of mutation
and selection among species are at the core of evolution. Already in the Marshallian
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definition of Economics, the latter was conceived to be much more closer to Biology
rather than Mechanical Physics:
The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in
economic dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than
those of mechanics; a volume on Foundations must therefore give a rel-
atively large place to mechanical analogies; and frequent use is made
of the term ”equilibrium,” which suggests something of statical analogy.
This fact, combined with the predominant attention paid in the present
volume to the normal conditions of life in the modern age, has suggested
the notion that its central idea is“statical”, rather than“dynamical”. But
in fact it is concerned throughout with the forces that cause movement:
and its key-note is that of dynamics, rather than statics. [Marshall,
(1890), vol. 1, p. xiv]
Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of the neoclassical economic analysis has been to
study market coordination as an equilibrium outcome. Coordination is not an easy
task: after all the economic processes are the results of individual decisions making
characterised by ex-ante possible inconsistencies. But, economic agents coordinate
themselves inside organizations, institutions, societies. Why do we observe such
emergence of order (where the meaning of order should be accurately distinguished
from the notion of equilibrium)?
As well known, the neoclassical response to the problem of coordination has been
my means of prices: exchange among decentralised agents, who are pursuing their
own utility maximization transactions, lead to the emergence of a market. When
demand and supply mutually intersect, equilibrium outcomes (that is a system of
prices and quantities) are derived: markets clear after all desired transactions have
occurred, so that equilibrium price system is such that nobody desires more than
what she obtained after the exchange. Apart from the easy criticism on the real-
ism of this approach, and particularly on the validity of the assumptions of perfect
competition and rational expectations, which have also been taken up in the neoclas-
sical analysis itself (taking on board, to varying degrees, imperfect competition and
asymmetric information), the processes of interactions and evolution of behaviour
have been remarkably neglected.
If dynamics and interactions count, the concept equilibrium ought to be re-
thought and substituted by the notion of coordination patterns. In fact, the usual
concern for equilibrium does not find much place inside the evolutionary theorizing.
Without postulating any ex-ante market clearing condition, necessary to endoge-
nously determine a closed solution for the unknown variables (e.g. prices and quan-
tities), evolutionary economic models are meant at understanding the coordination
patterns that result out of the interaction of heterogeneous agents. The scholar is
not interested in finding any deducted equilibrium solution, but rather in identi-
fying emergent properties. According to the seminal contribution by Lane, (1993),
emergent properties are:
[...] a feature of a history that (i) can be described in terms of aggregate-
level constructs, without reference to the attributes of specific MEs (Mi-
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crolevel Entities); (ii) persists for time periods much grater than the
time scale appropriate for describing the underling micro-interactions;
and (iii) defies explanation by reduction to the superposition of “built-
in” micro-properties of the AW [Artificial Worlds]. [Lane, (1993), p.
90-91]
Then, let us suppose to have an artificial world populated by machine-producers
who make new capital goods and machine-buyers who order the latter to produce
homogeneous good sold to the workers. The dynamics of aggregate output, con-
sumption and investment which typically exhibit sustained long run growth and
fluctuations are emergent properties not directly linked to the attributes of the
microlevel entities.
The emergent properties are conceived to be meta-stable and not unique nor
stable equilibria: whenever attributes at the microlevel are changed also the emer-
gent properties can be fairly different. Additionally, artificial economies are mainly
high-dimensional stochastic models, hardly treatable analytically. Then, asymp-
totic convergence toward a steady-state condition or stability are almost impossible
to prove analytically. But, notably the conditions under which ordered patterns or
trajectories emerge, are the relevant questions addressed by the analysis.
2.3 Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is a general feature of complex evolving economies in all domains
of observation. It concerns productivity dispersions at all levels of aggregation,
organizational forms, personal and functional income distributions.
In turn, these heterogeneous agents interact, although in the standard models
there is no sign of such interactions. The absence of any explicit coordination process
in the latter models is discussed in Kirman, (1992), in his devastating critique of
the representative agent (RA):
Paradoxically, the sort of macroeconomic models which claim to give a
picture of economic reality (albeit a simplified picture) have almost no
activity which needs such coordination. This is because typically they
assume that the choices of all the diverse agents in one sector-consumers
for example-can be considered as the choices of one ”representative”stan-
dard utility maximizing individual whose choices coincide with the ag-
gregate choices of the heterogeneous individuals. [Kirman, (1992), p.
117]
According to Kirman, (1992), the RA apparatus is not simply unrealistic but
wrong because not well-suited to study problems of emergence and particularly of
lack of coordination like unemployment, income inequality, and in general aggre-
gate demand externalities. Related, intrinsic, theoretical flaws of the representative
agent concern (i) the symmetry of behaviour between individual and collective ra-
tionality; (ii) the reaction of the RA to policy changes maybe fairly different from
the aggregate reaction of the individuals; (iii) the ordered of choices of the RA
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may not guarantee the individual preference ranking orders; (vi) whenever one does
hypothesis testing, trying to compare the model with the data, the modeller does
not know if, in case of rejection, has to reject specifically the RA or some other
behavioural hypotheses.
If the objective of the neoclassical modeller is to reach the exact microfoun-
dations, ensured by the optimization procedure performed by the RA, the latter
procedure intrinsically contradicts the inner meaning of microfoundation. All in all,
a direct consequence of the RA is that the no trade conundrum, according to which
no exchange should persistently occur as in equilibrium supply and demand clear,
becomes the rule and not the exception. Transactions are only mild turbulences
around the equilibrium point.
Results from the General Equilibrium scholars themselves highlighted by the
Sonneischann-Mantel-Debreau theorems show that assumed micro properties, like
transitivity of preferences, which if violated could lead to multiplicity of equilibria,
are not guaranteed by the aggregation process (unless homothetic utility functions,
e.g. satisfaction of the Gorman form of all micro agents) are postulated. The
only viable set-up explored in the neoclassical models to overcome the aggregation
problem has been reducing the dimensionality from n potentially heterogeneous
individuals (at least two in the original General Equilibrium program) to one. In
this latter case, the excess demand function will obviously satisfy all the regularity
conditions required to get uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium.
In an alternative perspective, Kirman, (1992) discusses under which circum-
stances aggregation among heterogeneous agents is sufficient to have a well behaved
aggregate demand function:
Once one allows for different micro-behavior and for the fact that dif-
ferent agents face differing and independent micro-variables then [...]
complex aggregate dynamics may arise from simple, [...], individual be-
havior. [Kirman, (1992)
p.127]
Becker, (1962) in the early sixties already emphasized how the law of demand is
the result of the change in the opportunities, due to the effects that price changes ex-
ert on the budget constraint, and are not related to any decision rules: the negative
demand slope is independent from the rational or irrational content of the decision
rules. A similar theoretical discussion is in Grandmont, (1991), who shows the rel-
atively unimportance of the maximization of a utility function, and conversely the
relevance of the simple satisfaction of the budget constraint to obtain well-behaved
aggregate demand functions. The conditions under which aggregation yields to
“well behaved” aggregate demand functions independently of the fine specification
of micro behaviours is in Hildenbrand, (1994).
More generally, the interaction among heterogeneous agents, by itself, allows for
the emergence of endogenous cycles and fluctuations, without the need of external
shocks hitting the system (see Dosi et al., 2010 among others).
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2.4 Innovation and Growth
The process of economic change as been at the core of the “Grand Evolutionary
Project” since the seminal book by Nelson and Winter, (1982). The early growth
neoclassical models have been identifying in the so called Solow residual or, using
the felicitous expression by Abramovitz, (1956), the measure of our ignorance, the
unaccounted source of economic growth. Rather surprisingly, the early scholars
of growth theory decided to shelve the enquiry exactly on the source of economic
growth, treating “technological change as a residual neutrino”:
The neutrino is a famous example in physics of a labelling of an error
term that proved fruitful. Physicists ultimately found neutrinos, and the
properties they turned out to have were consistent with preservation of
the basic theory as amended by acknowledgement of the existence of neu-
trinos. A major portion of the research by economists on processes of
economic growth since the late 1950s has been concerned with more ac-
curately identifying and measuring the residual called technical change,
and better specifying how phenomena related to technical advance fit
into growth theory more generally. The issue in question is the success
of this work. [Nelson and Winter, (1982), p. 198]
After the early growth models of exogenous technical change a´ la Solow, the
1990s saw the flourishing of the so called endogenous growth theory attempting to
incorporate inherently Schumpeterian themes into mainstream models. Nonetheless,
endogenous growth models do not seem able to account for some elements typically
characterizing the processes of innovation and growth.
As one of the early evolutionary models of technological change (Silverberg
and Verspagen, 1994) puts it, requirements needed to genuinely model endogenous
growth are (i) coexistence of many technologies and techniques of production at
any given time period; (ii) no unique production function (coexistence of multiple
techniques of production even at the frontier); (iii) dependence of the aggregate
rate of technical change on diffusion of innovation, not simply on the instantaneous
innovation rate; (iv) if the innovative effort is represented by a stochastic draw from
probability distributions, the parameters of the distributions have to be unknown
for firms.
In fact, such requirements appropriately map into a series of attributes of tech-
nology (see also below): search and discovery of innovation are processes intrinsically
characterised by Knigthian uncertainty wherein there is no exact correspondence be-
tween ex-ante effort and ex-post performance; there is no convergence toward an
optimal capital/labour ratio which defines the unique technique adopted by the
users, but rather a constellations of techniques of production are employed by dif-
ferent firms.
Then, in the evolutionary perspective it is the exactly contribution of knowl-
edge, which is transferred into the innovative active, which is “responsible” for the
neutrino. And innovation is a very special commodity which is not characterised by
scarcity and by diminishing returns, overturning the old perception of economics as
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the science of allocation of scarce resource. If knowledge and innovation become the
main determinants of economic growth, then abundance and dynamic increasing
returns are the rule and not the exception: worlds with endogenous innovation are
ubiquitously characterised by dynamic increasing returns. If anything, innovation
and knowledge accumulation are precisely the domains where the dismal principles
of scarcity and conservation are massively violated: one can systematically get more
out of less, while dynamic increasing returns are the general rule.
The known properties of information (its non-rival use, non-perishability, scale-
freeness in its application etc.), when taken seriously, imply that the usual General
Equilibrium properties can be ruled out. In fact as discussed in Radner and Stiglitz,
(1984), it is sufficient to assume nonconvexities in the production function, due e.g.
to the fixed cost of acquiring information. Given such nonconvexities, the existence
of equilibrium is not guaranteed (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 and its manual-
level acknowledgement in Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Under nonconvex technologies,
the supply curve is not equivalent to the marginal cost function and the intersection
with the demand curve is not ensured. Arrow, (1996) puts it bluntly:
[c]ompetitive equilibrium is viable only if production possibilities are
convex sets, that is do not display increasing return [...] with information
constant returns are impossible. [...] The same information [can be] used
regardless of the scale of production. Hence there is an extreme form of
increasing returns. [Arrow, 1996 p. 647-648]
In fact, the existence of a conventional General Equilibrium is undermined in
presence of innovation even neglecting increasing returns properties of innovation
itself: see Winter, (1971). In turn, the evolution of increasing returns is likely to
display as a norm, divergence in e.g. technological capabilities and incomes.
2.5 History
History and path dependency are at the center stage in evolutionary theorizing. So,
for example, in order to understand the process of evolution of a given technology,
it is fundamental to understand its historical origin. David, (1985) in his seminal
contribution emphasises the importance of the sequence of past events to interpret
economics as an evolutionary process:
Cicero demands of historians, first, that we tell true stories. I intend
fully to perform my duty on this occasion, by giving you a homely piece
of narrative economic history in which“one damn thing follows another”.
The main point of the story will become plain enough: it is sometimes
not possible to uncover the logic (or illogic) of the world around us
except by understanding how it got that way. A path-dependent se-
quence of economic changes is one of which important influences upon
the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, in-
cluding happenings dominated by chance elements rather than system-
atic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically
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to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are called non-ergodic.
In such circumstances “historical accidents” can neither be ignored, nor
neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic analysis; the dynamic
process itself takes on an essentially historical character. [David,
(1985), p. 332]
It is true that New Economic History has brought neoclassical economics to eco-
nomic history (Fogel, 1965), but it has done it in our view at an unreasonably high
price. Cliometrics, and later, the“New Political Economy” focus on the quantitative
assessments of sociological and institutional variables which are often then brought
into the estimation of long-run production functions. The price is the general as-
sumption that there is a functionally invariant generating process and an invariant
economic rationality applicable from Stone Age tribes to space Age societies.
Freeman and Louc¸a˜, (2001) provide an enticing discussion on cliometrics. A
series of unsatisfying outputs of this research stream culminated with the descrip-
tion of slavery condition as a rational optimizing behaviour for both parties of the
contract: the owners were praised for the superiority of their managerial capabil-
ities and the slaves for the superior quality of black labour. Cliometrics, apart
from abruptly importing the homo economicus, carried also the notion that sheer
randomness could adequately capture historical events: first, some of them are con-
sidered as random, exogenous events altering the regular (equilibrium) dynamics;
second, historical time series themselves are considered equivalent to a sample from
a universe of alternative realizations of the same stochastic process. It is basically
an ergodic world where “deep history” does not count.
Landes, (1994) emphasises the inappropriateness of the foregoing research
agenda in providing exhaustive explanation of historical phenomena:
I am convinced that the very complexity of large systematic changes
requires complex explanation: multiple causes of shifting relative im-
portance, combinative dependency,...temporal dependency. [Landes,
(1994), p. 653]
Complex evolving systems are typically non-ergodic, thus displaying path-
dependencies: where you go depends on where you come from.
2.6 Institutions
In absence of rational, profit-seeking maximizing agents, what does it shape the
behaviour of individuals and organizations? How the relatively ordered patterns
above mentioned are able to emerge? Is it all the outcome of self-organization?
We have been emphasizing above how (imperfect) coordination and (relatively)
ordered change can be interpreted as phenomena of self-organization among multiple
interacting agents. However, such processes are embedded into institutions which
shape and constrain behaviors and modes of interaction. They include markets, but
even more important, other non-market institutions ranging from families to firms,
from unions to universities to public agencies.
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In turn, “good-matchings” or “mismatchings” among institutional forms are at
the core of well-tuned and fragile phases of capitalism development. This is what
has been studied by the (mainly French) Regulation School who identified the so
called Regimes of Regulation (see Boyer, 1988).
Three main domains of the Regimes of Regulation are especially relevant to
study the capitalist dynamics, namely: (i) the accumulation regime which entails the
relations among technological progress, income distribution and aggregate demand,
(ii) the institutional forms which encompass the wage-labour nexus and nature
of the State, (iii) the mode of regulation comprises the mechanisms by which the
former two domains evolve, develop and interact. The modes of regulation capture
the specificities of the process of adjustments in the accumulation patterns and in
the coordination among different types of actors. Such dynamics yields phases of
“smooth” coordination, mismatches, cycles and crises.
The major question is, then, the coherence and compatibility of a given
technical system with a pattern of accumulation, itself defined by a com-
plex set of economic regularities and mechanisms affecting competition,
demand, the labour market, credit and state intervention. The major
finding is the following: there are several different modes of development
and regulation observed in history – there is no single universal mode.
[Boyer, (1988) p. 68]
The notion of mode of regulation disposes of the standard static equilibrium. It
is made of a set of norms, rules, behaviours collectively consistent entailing some
distinctive features: (i) decentralised decisions are taken without the need for each
individual or organization to understand the whole system; (ii) it shapes the accu-
mulation regime; (iii) it reproduces a system of social relationships.
The role of the industrial relations, the mechanism of wage determination, the
relative power of conflicting classes, the industrial and labour policies are also im-
portant elements in shaping the national systems of innovation (Nelson, 1993). Non-
market institutions are crucial for the understanding of the process of innovative
search and more generally of economic dynamics:
[...] there is a lot more to the institutional structure of modern economies
than for-profit firms and markets. Firms and markets do play a role in
almost all arenas of economic activity, but in most they share the stage
with other institutions. In many sectors firms and markets clearly are the
dominant institutions, but in some they play a subsidiary role. National
security, education, criminal justice and policing are good examples.
Some sectors, like medical care, are extremely “mixed”, and one cannot
understand the activity going on in them, or the ways in which their
structure, ways of doing things, and performance have evolved, if one
pays attention only to firms and markets. [Nelson, (2016), p. 18]
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2.7 Methodology: why computer simulation
Given the foregoing interpretation of economic dynamics, the choice of the right
instruments of analysis is of paramount importance (in the following, we shall just
address the modelling domain, even if well aware of the complementarity with statis-
tical and historical analyses). To overcome the straitjacket imposed by the standard
tools, we advocate an extensive use of computer simulation, concerning both indi-
vidual action and system-level interactions.
It would appear, therefore, that a model of process is an essential compo-
nent in any positive theory of decision making that purports to describe
the real world, and that the neoclassical ambition of avoiding the neces-
sity for such a model is unrealizable. [Simon, (1979), p.
507]
The choice of computer simulation models is not by chance: it allows to de-
scribe the economic agents as behaving according to procedural routines, which are
executed under the form of algorithms, wherein sequence of actions and events in
discrete time can be explicitly inserted and described, and heterogeneity is explic-
itly modelled. Simulations, in this respect, are not simply used to mimic but to test
hypotheses.
By converting empirical evidence about a decision-making process into a
computer program, a path is opened both for testing the adequacy of the
program mechanisms for explaining the data, and for discovering the key
features of the program that account, qualitatively, for the interesting
and important characteristics of its behavior. [Simon, (1979), p. 508]
Many criticisms have been addressed to computer simulation models, or as they
are nowadays labelled, Agent Based Models, particularly, (i) lack of rigorous in the
specification of the behavioural equations; (ii) lack of parameter estimation; and
(iii) lack of robustness.
The first critique seems to hold in so far as ABMs are a methodology which
leaves room of manoeuvre to the modeller, allowing the choice among different
specifications of behavioural rules. Conversely, in the neoclassical models only one
rule is admissible, the maximizing behaviour. However, the greater discipline of the
latter is deceiving. The mainstream modeller is allowed full freedom on the choice
of the arguments of the function, the functional form and the constraints, without
any external consistency check (“do actually agents do that?”).
Conversely, ABMs undertake a thorough external consistency check in be-
havioural rules, modes of interaction and timeline of events, which define the chrono-
logical order according to which the procedures are undertaken. Thus, the model is
asked to be coherent and as close as possible to empirical data. Only abandoning the
deductive-normative approach of the maximization endeavour, the modeller is able
to test the validity of behavioural rules and algorithms vis-a`-vis empirical results.
In particular, the modeller searches for stylised facts or empirical regularities.
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The second critique is the lack of parameter estimation. According to Brock,
(1999), regularities or scaling laws which are particular widespread in economics
are:
[...] ‘unconditional objects’, i.e. they only give properties of stationary
distributions, e.g. ‘invariant measures’, and hence cannot say much
about the dynamics of the stochastic process which generated them. To
put it another way, they have little power to discriminate across broad
classes of stochastic processes. [Brock, (1999), p. 410]
But the emergence of these scaling law, even if does not allow to discriminate
among alternative stochastic processes all equally able to replicate the same uncon-
ditional objects, are useful to identify acceptable and non acceptable theories:
Nevertheless, if a robust scaling law appears in data, this does restrict
the acceptable class of conditional predictive distributions somewhat.
Hence, I shall argue that scaling law studies can be of use in economic
science provided they are handled and interpreted properly [...] scaling
laws can help theory formation by provision of discipline on the shape
of the ‘invariant measure’ predicted by a candidate theory. [Brock,
(1999) p.411]
Brock, (1999) advocates both the analysis of unconditional objects and the esti-
mation of conditional ones. ABMs, we suggest, are the best art-form so far available
to undertake both exercises. Such models can be used for both thought experi-
ments and also as laboratories for policy experiments. Instead of performing the
usual methods of causality detection proposed by the toolbox of econometrics, what
ABMs allow is to model “artificial” worlds.
When ABMs are implemented, the protocol one follows implies: (i) using un-
conditional objects to reject theories unable to match statistical regularities, (ii)
performing policy experiments which allow to understand the reaction of the system
when hit by both external shocks, including policy changes, and, equally important,
endogenous technological, organizational ones, and structural changes as well.
The ability to match statistical regularities, and particularly large ensemble of
statistical regularities at the micro level, attempts to meet the external consistency
criteria mentioned above. In accordance with Brock, (1999), ones does not simply
try to find unconditional objects, but to build models able to provide a sound
explanation of the statistical regularities at different levels of observation. Not all
statistical objects are equivalent litmus tests to accept/reject a theory. Replicating
business cycle co-movements is difficult but not too difficult. Obtaining Pareto
distributions or similarly skewed ones in whatever measure of micro interacting
agents is relatively easy: in fact, they are all likely a signature of complexity as
such. Getting the two together is much more difficult, and even more is matching
the empirical regularities concerning the relative magnitude of the higher moments
of different variables.
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Finally, the last critique regards the lack of robustness, according to which the
results in ABMs tend to be local and potentially valid only for a small set of the
parameter space, with the value of these parameters often not estimated.
Notably, ABMs are nonlinear, high dimensional, complex models wherein, to re-
peat, inputs strongly differ from outputs. Conversely, standard neoclassical models
are linearised models around the steady-state. Hence, the two modelling approaches
are poles apart in the “epistemological weight” they attribute to the appropriateness
of the underlying assumptions about behaviour and interaction mechanisms vs. pur-
ported predicting abilities. In ABMs, the values of the parameters are set as close
as possible to empirical data, whenever available, even if admittedly often without
any direct estimation of their distributions, as they are not generally available.
On the contrary, neoclassical macroeconomic models like DSGE, being linearised
in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium values, tend to exhibit a low ability in
generating outputs which are different from the inputs themselves. Here, the epis-
temological strategy is exactly the opposite. The structural model is assumed to
be axiomatically true, and on the ground of such truth, the value of the parame-
ters are calibrated in order to match the empirics, by e.g. minimizing the distance
between the series produced by the model and the empirical ones. Following a cali-
bration procedure, the modeller does not perform any testing on the inherent model
structure, but simply imputes estimated values of the parameters.
In a nutshell, while standard macroeconomic model focus on parameter estima-
tions, ABMs entail a sort of theory corroboration. Whenever a model is able to
robustly replicate a number of stylised facts, without imposing specific values for
the parameters, the mechanisms inside the model itself are reliable explanations of
the facts empirically observed.
One open challenge ahead is the comparability between high-dimensional
ABMs and low-dimensional aggregate law of motions. Can we get rid of high-
dimensionality, both in terms of heterogeneity and in terms of variables and pa-
rameter space, and still capture some fundamental dynamics of the system? Or
putting it an another way, what are the complementarity, if any, between ABMs
and classical non-microfounded model such those in the tradition of Kaldor, (1940);
Goodwin, (1951); Pasinetti, (1960)?
3 Domains
These are parts of the building blocks of a “grand evolutionary program” (discussed
at greater length in Dosi and Winter, 2002) to put at work with respect to the
formalization of four main domain of analyses: (i) technologies; (ii) organizations;
(iii) corporate learning, competition and industrial dynamics; and (iv) coordination
and growth from the micro to the macroeconomic patterns.
3.1 Technologies
Technological innovation, paraphrasing Landes, (1969), has been and is a central
driver of the Unbound Prometheus fuelling economic growth at least since the in-
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dustrial revolution. The classics - and in particular Adam Smith - were well aware
of it, but for almost two centuries thereafter, not much progress had been made in
our understanding of the ways new technical knowledge is generated, and how its
impact works through the economy (Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter stand out
as major exceptions).The importance of technological change reappeared, almost
by default, in Robert Solow’s growth analysis in the 50’s, but it is only over the
last half century that one has systematically started looking inside the blackbox of
technology (Rosenberg, 1982).
Fundamental contributions to such a de-blackboxing have come, first, from the
analysis of the economic properties of information as such, including, as already
mentioned, its non-rivalness; indivisibility; and scale freeness in its use; and the
(related) increasing returns property both in its utilization and its accumulation
over time. However, second, at least equally fundamental contributions have come
from the appreciation of the differences between technological knowledge and sheer
information - including its varying degrees of tacitness, its organizational embod-
iment, the difficulties of inter- and intra-organizational replication, and its crucial
dependence upon the characteristics of particular technological bases.
In the opening up of the technological black box, the account of technologies
in terms of pieces of knowledge, their combinations, and their changes has to be
complemented by a more operational representation of technology in action. The
conception, design and completion of whatever artefact, generally involves (often
very long) sequences of cognitive and physical acts. Hence, it is useful to think of a
technology also like a recipe entailing a design for a final product, whenever there
is a final physical artefact, together with a set of procedures for achieving it.
A major advancement and contribution in the Economics of Innovation is the
notion that each technology needs to be understood as comprising (a) a specific
body of knowledge and practice - in the form of processes for achieving particular
ends - together with an ensemble of required artifacts, on the input side; and (b)
quite often some shared notion of a design of a desired output artefact. These el-
ements, together, can be usefully considered as constituent parts of a technological
paradigm (Dosi, 1982, 1988). A paradigm embodies an outlook, a definition of the
relevant problems to be addressed and the patterns of enquiry in order to address
them. It entails specific templates for the solution to ensembles of techno-economic
problems based on highly selected principles derived from natural sciences, jointly
with specific rules aimed at acquiring related new knowledge. Finally, technological
paradigms identify the operative constraints on prevailing best practice, and the
problem solving heuristics deemed promising for pushing back those constraints.
Moreover, technological paradigms both provide a focus for efforts to advance a
technology and channel them along distinct technological trajectories, with advances
(made by many different agents) proceeding over significant periods of time in cer-
tain relatively invariant directions, in the space of techno-economic characteristics
of artefacts and production processes.
The technologies as knowledge and as recipe perspective offers an enormous
progress in the understanding of what technological knowledge is all about as com-
pared to the blackboxing entailed by the traditional representation of technology
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as output = f(list of ingredients). Moreover, the recipe perspective offers promising
venues also to the formal representation of the dynamics of problem-solving proce-
dures involved in any technological activity, within organizations in particular. In
such a procedural view, the orienting focus is not immediately the list of inputs and
equipment used to produce, say, a semiconductor of certain properties, but rather
it rests in the design of the devices and the procedures used in the transformation
of the raw silicon into a microprocessor.
Concerning technological advance, modifications and refinements of procedures
and designs are where the action is, while changes in input/output relations (the
production functions) are in a way the by-product of successful attempts to achieve
effective procedures and designs with certain performances, and to change them in
the desired directions. Thus, what comes under the heading of production functions
of whatever kind, is basically just the ex-post description of what appears in the
quantity part of the recipes. Note also that, dynamically, in most cases efforts
to change recipes directly entail changes in input characteristics and intensities
and, conversely, attempts to substitute one input for another involve changes in
production procedures. Symmetrically, attempts to substitute the more expensive
inputs - so easy when seen from the angle of some standard production function -
often require the painstaking search of new recipes and effective procedures.
Granted that, a question with crucial ramification for any theory of production
regards precisely the mappings between procedure-centred and input/output cen-
tred representations of technologies. Suppose one has a metric in the input/output
space, and one is also able to develop, a (albeit inevitable fuzzy) metric in the high
dimensional problem-solving space. Next, how do the latter map into the former?
Issues of the same kind regard the relationship between changes in the recipes,
on the one hand, and changes in the relative intensities in the use of the various
inputs, on the other. Do small changes in procedures correspond to small changes in
input/output relations? And, vice versa, do major technological revolutions affect-
ing the way of doing things imply also major changes in the proportions in which
different artefacts and types of labour enter into the recipes for whatever output?
That is, basically, what are the relationships between changes in technological pro-
cedures and the characteristics of technological trajectories, both in the spaces of
product characteristics and of input coefficients?
3.2 Organizations
A good deal of innovations are generated within corporate organizations, while tech-
nological and organizational innovations are often intertwined. Thus, it is crucial to
progress in the formal exploration of the properties of economic organizations seen
as problem-solving entities. It is promising to represent them in terms of explicit
sequences of activities and procedures nested into specific organizational arrange-
ments prescribing who send which signal to whom, and who does what and in which
consequence.
Notwithstanding promising inroads (see Marengo and Dosi, 2005 and Dosi et
al., 2003; Dosi and Marengo, 2015), models still fall short of an explicit formal
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account of (i) the emergence and dynamics of organizational routines; (ii) the re-
lated role organizational memory; and finally, (iii) the links between organizational
architectures, knowledge distribution and performances.
The knowledge of an organization regards, first, its cognitive memory - the
structure of beliefs, interpretative frameworks, codes, cultures by which the organi-
zation interprets the state of the environment and its own “internal states” (Levitt
and March, 1988). Second, organizational knowledge includes routines - compris-
ing standard operating procedures, rules and other patterned actions: call that the
operational memory of the organization. Both, cognitive models and operational
repertoires are the outcomes of learning processes and thus evolve over time in
response to experimentation and feedbacks from the environment. However, they
might often bear quite high degrees of inertia and path-dependent reproduction, as
in fact, by its nature, organizational memory reproduces over time what an organi-
zation has learned throughout its history.
Signals from the environments, as well as from other parts of the organization,
elicit particular cognitive responses, conditional upon the collective mental models
that the organization holds. Cognitive memory maps signals from an otherwise
unknown world into cognitive states (this year the state of the market is such that
it will be profitable to produce X). Conversely, the operational memory elicits op-
erating routines in response to cognitive states (“this year we should produce X”),
internal states of the organization (“the machines are ready to start producing piece
P”) and also environmental feedbacks (“after all X is not selling too well”).
Cognitive and operational memories entail an if → then structure. A promis-
ing candidate to model them finds its roots into the formalism of classifier systems
(Holland, 1975, 1986): a pioneering application developed in Marengo, (1992) and
subsequent refinements in Dosi et al., (2017). On the ground of such formal appa-
ratus one can first analyze the effects in terms of performances of different distri-
butions of knowledge and of the related memory elements within the organization
(e.g. whether hierarchically versus horizontally distributed, etc...) conditional upon
different characteristics of the environment. Second, this type of models may help
to explore the conjecture – well grounded in several empirical studies – that a mem-
ory structure well “fit” for a particular environment may turn out to be pernicious
under different technological or market conditions (cf. among others Tripsas and
Gavetti, 2000 and Bresnahan et al., 2011). In fact, in many respects, much work has
still to be done in the exploration of the outcomes of the mappings between types
of knowledge, memory characteristics, organizational architectures and patterns of
environmental change.
3.3 Corporate Learning, Competition and Industrial Evolution
In modern capitalism, business firms are a central locus of the efforts to advance
technologies, develop new products and operate new production processes. Thus
the knowledge and the procedures underlying each technology, discussed in the
previous section, are to a good extent embodied in organizational routines and
other“quasi genetic action patterns”of organizations (Winter in Cohen et al., 1996).
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Indeed, an emerging capability-based theory of the firm (cf. Dosi et al., 2001; Dosi
et al., 2008 among others) places the “primitives” of the nature of business firms
in their problem-solving features, that is their abilities to address practical and
cognitive problems, ranging from, say, the production of a car to the identification
of a malaria-curing molecules.
The approach, which finds its roots in the works of H. Simon, J. March, A.
Chandler and S. Winter - fully acknowledging ubiquitous forms of human bounded
rationality, grossly imperfect processes of learning and diverse social distributions of
cognitive labour - attempts to identify the distinctive capabilities of organizations
as emergent from their distinctive ensembles of organizational routines. And, dy-
namically, the approach tries to account for the processes by which organizational
knowledge is acquired, maintained, augmented and sometimes lost - partly as a
result of the dynamic capabilities of organization themselves (Teece et al., 1997;
Helfat, 2007).
Idiosyncratic capabilities and, dynamically, idiosyncratic patterns of learning
by firms are the general rule. In turn, such persistently heterogeneous firms are
nested in competitive environments, which shape their individual economic fate
and, collectively, the evolution of the forms of industrial organization. Differences
in products and in processes of production - and as a consequence costs and prices
- are central features of the competitive process in which firms are involved in
different ways. Let us call Schumpeterian competition the process through which
heterogeneous firms compete on the basis of the products and services they offer and
obviously their prices, and get selected - with some firms growing, some declining,
some going out of business, some new ones always entering. Such processes of
competition and selection are continuously fuelled by the activities of innovation,
adaptation, imitation by incumbent firms and by entrants. In turn, the processes of
industrial evolution leaves statistical footprints in terms of industrial structures and
firm dynamics. Thanks to massive infusions of micro-data over the last 20 years,
one has begun to identify a few robust statistical properties characterizing industrial
structures, their changes, and performance indicators.
In general, evolutionary interpretations are grounded on two basic building
blocks. The first is a learning part wherein individual agents (firms), massively
boundedly rational but always able to innovate, search for new techniques and new
products and the second is a selection part whereby market interactions determine
ex-post profitabilities, survival probabilities and firm rates of growth. More on the
structure of evolutionary models of industrial dynamics in Silverberg et al., (1988)
and Silverberg and Lehnert, (1994) Metcalfe, (1998) Dosi et al., (1995, 2015b).
The (idiosyncratic) learning part of the dynamics is often represented as a
stochastic search for innovation and imitation in the neighbourhood of the incum-
bent techniques of each firm. Conversely, the selection part of the process is basically
captured by different instantiations of some replication dynamics. The bottom line
is a relation between some corporate characters - that is, technological, organiza-
tional, or behavioural traits - which the particular interactive environment favours,
on the one hand, and the rate of variation of the frequencies in the carriers of such
characters in the relevant populations on the other.
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One has only begun to systematically link evolutionary models with the styl-
ized facts of industrial dynamics discussed above. Here the big challenge regards
the ability of the models of generating - and in that sense explaining - the rich
ensembles of observed empirical regularities, both those that are generic, holding
across sectors, countries and phases of the industry life cycles, and those that are
regime-specific. In that the phenomena to be explained - ranging from size distri-
butions and other measures of industrial structures such as concentration, to the
distributions of corporate growth rates all the way to the determinants of growth
itself - ought to be understood, again, as emergent properties stemming from the
out-of-equilibria interaction of heterogeneous, far from omniscient, but potentially
innovative, agents.
In particular, to date, the generality of evolutionary models has assumed some
monotonicity in the relations between fundamental determinants of competitive-
ness/revealed fitness, and subsequent relative growth. However, the evidence on
these selective processes suggests that selection forces are weaker than those the-
orised. In turn, this may well be the consequence of various forms of market im-
perfections - including informational ones - which, together with endemic satisfying
behaviours, allow firms characterized by diverse degrees of efficiency and product
qualities to co-exist without too much relative pressure. On the modelling side such
evidence demands an account of evolution occurring over multidimensional fitness
landscapes - explicitly capturing the multidimensional differences in product charac-
teristics - rugged, thus allowing for multiple metastable states, but also intertwined
by ample flat areas - whereby selective pressures are relatively low.
3.4 From micro to macro coordination and growth
We have already discussed above that the interpretation of macroeconomic dynam-
ics must have, in our view, micro-foundations explicitly resting on multiplicity of
heterogeneous interacting agents. Granted that, there are two complementary mod-
elling perspectives.
In a first one, which we could call coordination without evolution, one may
study the condition under which coordination emerges, intertwined by major phase
changes, in markets, and other interacting environments, wherein agents interact
and adjust locally. The fundamentals of such environments might well be sta-
tionary (hence, strictly speaking, no evolution), but the thread of interactions and
adjustments typically yields non linear macroscopic effects characterized by diverse
patterns of coordination (or lack of it). A lot of work has been done in this per-
spective (for surveys, see Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006 and LeBaron and Tesfatsion,
2008) offering theoretical tales on self-organizing patterns. Still, one is quite far
from a thorough understanding of how markets work, conditional on their different
network structures, as convincingly advocated by Kirman, (2011).
Together, let us strongly urge the investigation of coordination with evolution
on the ground of higher dimensional, phenomenologically much richer Agent Based
Models. Within a growing ensemble of ABM efforts (see Fagiolo and Roventini,
2016 for a recent survey), the authors of this note intend to proceed in refining and
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developing upon the family of “Schumpeter meeting Keynes” models (Dosi et al.,
2013, 2015a, 2010, 2016a,b). They clearly meet Solow, (2008)’s plea for micro-
heterogeneity: a multiplicity of agents interact without any ex ante commitment to
the reciprocal consistency of their actions.
This family of models bridges Keynesian theories of demand generation and
Schumpeterian theories of technology-fuelled economic growth. Agents always face
opportunities of innovations and imitation, which they try to tap with expensive
search efforts, under conditions of genuine uncertainty (so they are unable to form
any accurate expectations on the relation between search investment and prob-
abilities of successful outcomes). Hence (endogenous) technological shocks (the
innovations themselves) are unpredictable and idiosyncratic.
This family of models builds on evolutionary roots, but is also in tune with
genuine Keynesian insights. It tries to explore the feedbacks between the factors in-
fluencing aggregate demand and those driving technological change. By doing that,
it begins to offer a unified framework jointly accounting for long-term dynamics and
higher frequencies fluctuations. The model is “structural” in the sense that it explic-
itly builds on a representation of what agents do, how they adjust, how they interact
and respond to policy changes. Indeed, the model has already proved to be able
to generate jointly, as emergent properties, a wide set of stylized facts regarding
both micro/meso phenomena and macro stylized facts. They include (i) endoge-
nous growth; (ii) persistent fluctuations; (iii) recurrent involuntary unemployment;
(iv) pro-cyclical consumption, investment, productivity, employment and changes
in inventories; (v) fat-tailed distributions of aggregate growth rates; together with
persistent asymmetries in productivity across firms; (vi) spiky investment patterns;
(vii) skewed firm size distributions; (viii) fat-tailed firm growth rates, and (ix) on the
labour market side Beveridge, Wage (or Phillips), and Okun curves, (x) separation
and hiring rates volatility, (xi) matching function, (xii) productivity, unemploy-
ment and vacancy rates volatility, (xiii) unemployment and inequality correlation
(cf. Dosi et al., 2016b). To repeat, the foregoing robust statistical regularities and
relatively stable relations amongst aggregate variables do indeed emerge out of tur-
bulent, disequilibrium, microeconomic interactions. As such, the model can be used
also as sort of “laboratory” for policy experiments. We have begun to do it, showing,
for example, the complementarity between Keynesian and Schumpeterian policies.
4 Some challenges ahead, by way of a conclusion
In these notes we have tried to offer an evolutionary view on, possibly, the two major
questions which cut across the whole history of economics as a discipline, namely the
drivers of change and the coordinating properties of a system composed by multiple
interacting agents. In many ways, they are a sort of advocacy of “back to the
classics”, especially Smith, Malthus and Marx, albeit with much more sophisticated
formal and computational instruments. The basic interpretative conjecture here is
that the properties we observe stem from the fact that the capitalist economies are
the first ones in human history which incessantly “change from within”. And it is
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this very feature which accounts for the relatively orderly interactions which one
often observes.
There is a lot that is there to be done on the theory side. And even more so, it
has to be done on sides of statistics and of theory-informed, qualitative, historical
interpretation, what Nelson and Winter, (1982) call “appreciative theorizing”. Just
to name a few domains.
Some challenges were already there in the largely unfilled “Santa Fe complexity
programme” (see the introduction by Pines to Anderson et al., 1988). For example,
first how do agents behave and learn in complex evolving environments? Eco-
nomics, especially over the last half a century, has put an overwhelming emphasis
on expectations in the interpretation of behaviour, unique in all disciplines, which
matured beyond “Aristotelian” final causes. But that, in turns, implies a univer-
sally, transparent present and future, which is hardly in tune with innovation-ridden
evolutionary worlds.
Second, how does one formally accounts for evolutionary processes wherein the
dimensionality of the state-space progressively evolve?
Third, even short of that current econometric techniques are postulated upon
unique equilibrium states shocked by exogenous disturbances. But, what if there
are e.g. non-linear dynamics with multiple local attractors, persistently perturbed
by endogenously generated shocks, how do we account for them?
Forth, and well beyond the Santa Fe programme, what is the theory of value
and income distribution in knowledge intensive worlds, generally characterised by
increasing returns? Note, in this respect, that if one loose convexity in production
plans, one looses also the link between the theory of production and the theory of
income distribution. In our view, this is just a good news, but it poses a problem
also for classical, cost-based theories: what is the value of a Microsoft software or
a drug: whenever the cost of replication is minor, is it just proportional to the cost
of engineers and scientists who generated them?
The list is far from being exhaustive. And this is matched by equally important
(or even more important) interpretative issues which have to do with the contem-
porary dynamics of capitalist economies.
A first one concerns labour market, wages and employment. The innovation-
employment nexus deserves overriding attention. In the wake of a potential fourth
Industrial Revolution, of a debate on productivity decline, “secular stagnation” and
future robotization, research addressing the effects on both the quantity and the
quality of employment is needed, as well as the balance between product and process
innovation in terms of employment creation-destruction.
A second related one is inequality. It is and will be the core topic, together with
unemployment, of the next many years. Even though the post-crisis period has been
marked by an overwhelming and blossoming literature on inequality, still detailed
studies looking inside the transformation at work-floor, the wage determination
processes, the organization of the industrial relations, the process of de-unionisation
are partly missing and badly needed. Beside that, what do we know about the
potential link between productivity and wage dispersion, as possible determining
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mechanisms causing wage inequality, as compared to other mechanisms such as
globalization and the financialization of the economies?
On the modelling side, the Schumpeter meeting Keynes model leaves scope for
many potential avenues for further research: (i) the analysis of the effect of long-term
versus short-term labour contracts on firm productivity, digging inside the impact
of contract duration on the process of workers skills accumulation, and consequently
on productivity; (ii) a north-south version direct at studying the effect of flows of
capital goods, consumption goods and workers among two countries, a leading and a
lagging one, analysing the emergence of patterns of product specialization vis-a`-vis
diversification, cost-competitiveness vis-a`-vis technological competitiveness, growth
convergence vis-a`-vis divergence; (iii) the effect of product vis-a`-vis process innova-
tion in terms of creation/destruction of labour demand.
And last but not least, policy analyses involve a fundamental paradigmatic
change: the central concern for policies ought to shift away from efficient allo-
cation issues, to the (imperfect) governance of coordination (Kirman, 2011), and of
genuinely uncertain processes of change.
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